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INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 1998, the government of Trinidad and Tobago
("Trinidad") notified the Secretary General of the Organization of
American States ("OAS") that it was withdrawing its ratification of
the American Convention on Human Rights ("American Conven-
tion").' That withdrawal became effective one year later.2 With the
1. See Trinidad and Tobago: Notice to Denounce the American Convention
on Human Rights (May 26, 1998) [hereinafter Notice to Denounce], reprinted in
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, Sig-
natures & Current Status of Ratifications of the American Convention, OAS/ser.
L/V/I.4, doc. rev. 7, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org.basic.htm (Feb. 2, 2000)
[hereinafter Basic Documents] (arguing that because the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights could not expedite petitions to the Commission on capital
cases, the resulting delay would subject those sentenced to death in Trinidad and
Tobago to cruel and unusual punishment, in contravention of Article 5(2)(b) of the
country's Constitution). The government asserted that it would not "allow the in-
ability of the [Inter-American] Commission [on Human Rights] to deal with appli-
cations in respect of capital cases expeditiously to frustrate the implementation of
the lawful penalty for the crime of murder in Trinidad and Tobago." M.
2. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 78,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1, OEA/ser. L./V/II.23 doc. rev. 2 (entered into force July 18,
1978) [hereinafter American Convention], reprinted in Basic Documents, supra
note I (providing that "States Parties may denounce [the] Convention at the expi-
ration of a five-year period from the date of its entry into force and by means of
notice given one year in advance.").
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denunciation effective, Trinidad continued its rigorous campaign to
implement the death sentences of several convicted murderers, de-
spite the fact that many of them were still awaiting a ruling by an in-
ternational organization on the alleged human rights abuses they suf-
fered at the hands of the Trinidadian government.'
Unfortunately, in its attempt to speed up the process of carrying
out local executions, Trinidad has virtually eliminated a significant
mechanism that guarantees due process of law, namely the ability of
its citizens to make complaints of human rights abuses to interna-
tional bodies. In fact, the Trinidadian government is now attempting
to pass new legislation that would allow executions to take place be-
fore petitions to international bodies, such as the OAS, are resolved
or decided: This course of action not only jeopardizes due process
3. See Tony Thompson, No Mercv Ibr Trinidad's Ruthless Gang Bosses:
Caribbean Gallows Fever Reflects a Society Sick to Death of Violent Crime, THE
OBSERVER, May 30, 1999, 1999 WL 13403710 (discussing support for the death
penalty in Trinidad as a deterrent to rising crime rates). Opinion polls in Trinidad
show that nearly 95% of the population support the death penalty. See ,L; see also
Trinidad Survey: Capital Punishment Wll Reduce Crime, EFE NEWS SERv., June
15, 1999, WL ALLNEWSPLUS file (announcing that seventy-seven percent of
Trinidadians support capital punishment as a means to deter murder and crime);
Stephen Breen, Trinidad Begins Executing Killers, THE SCOTSMAN, June 5, 1999,
1999 WL 18798193 (reporting on the first three of nine hangings in Trinidad since
1994); ANN. REP. OF THE INTER-AM. COMM'N ON H.R. (OAS) 1364 (1999), avail-
able at http://wvw.cidh.oas.orglannualreports.htm [hereinafter IACHR ANN. REP.
1999] (denouncing the fact that Trinidad had executed three additional applicants
with cases before the Commission - Naresh Boodram, Joey Ramiah, and Anthony
Briggs).
4. See AMNESTY INT'L ANN. REP. (1999) [hereinafter Al ANN. REP. 1999]
(discussing specific cases of executions in Trinidad and the government's attempts
to boycott the appeals process available through international institutions such as
the OAS and the United Nations); see also Peter Richards, Trinidad and Tobago:
Nation Withdrawsfr-om Human Rights Pact, INTER PRESS SERV., Apr. 18, 2000,
LEXIS, News Library, Inter Press Serv. File (announcing that Tnnidad and To-
bago had notified the United Nations that it intended to withdraw from the Op-
tional Protocol to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights). Such a move significantly limits the possibility of appealing to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee for review of death penalty executions and
sentences because it withdraws the right of the individual to petition the Human
Rights Committee. See id. See generally Natalia Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws tile
Right of Individual Petition Under the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (1998) (discussing the implications of with-
drawal from the Optional Protocol on human rights).
5. See Peter Richards, Rights - Trinidad and Tobago. Gov't Pushes to Speed
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rights of Trinidadian citizens, but also threatens the further develop-
ment and strengthening of the Inter-American human rights system.6
This Comment analyzes the implications of the Trinidadian gov-
ernment's decision to withdraw from the American Convention, spe-
cifically with respect to due process guarantees.7 Part I briefly out-
lines the Inter-American system for protecting human rights, the
rights available to individual citizens to petition the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") for redress of human
rights violations, and the obligations of States Parties to its citizens.!
Part II discusses the breadth of Trinidadian obligations in the after-
math of its withdrawal from the American Convention, if any. Spe-
cifically, it addresses whether the IACHR and the Inter-American
Executions, INTER PRESS SERV., May 17, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Inter Press Serv. File (noting the reintroduction of Constitution Amendment No. 2
Bill in Parliament, also known as the Hanging Bill, which states that the High
Court would have "no jurisdiction to hear an application against the execution of
the death warrant" after the time for appeal had passed or after the Privy Council
had dismissed or refused a petition). This amendment would have the effect of al-
lowing executions to occur even if the offenders had petitions before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights or the United Nations Human Rights
Commission. See id.; cf Leonard E. Birdsong, Is There a Rush to the Death Pen-
allt in the Caribbean: The Bahamas Says No, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMrP. L.J. 285,
295 (1999) (discussing the ruling of the highest court of appeal for Trinidad - the
Privy Council in England- that the Trinidadian government must wait for the deci-
sion of the IACHR before it can constitutionally execute anyone); Order of the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights of August 29, 1998: Provisional Measures
Adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Matter of the Re-
public of Trinidad and Tobago - The James et al. Case, [hereinafter IACtHR Court
Order], in ANN. REP. OF THE INTER-AM. CT. ON H.R. TO THE GEN. ASSEMB., 317
OEA/ser. G CP/doc.3169/99 (1999) [hereinafter IACTHR REP. TO GEN. ASSFMB.
1999] (noting Trinidad and Tobago's refusal to recognize the IACtHR's decisions
as binding, and ordering the Trinidadian government to stay the executions of the
individuals who had been sentenced to death and who still had petitions before the
IACHR).
6. See Al ANN. REP. 1999, supra note 4 (noting that Trinidad's decision to
withdraw from the American Convention would have a detrimental effect on the
Inter-American human rights system because it precludes international investiga-
tion of alleged human rights abuses); infra notes 204-205 (discussing the impact of
Trinidad's withdrawal from the American Convention on other Caribbean nations).
7. See infra Part V (discussing the due process implications of the Trinidadian
government's actions).
8. See infra Parts I.A-I.B (discussing the legal avenues available within the
Inter-American system to individuals complaining of human rights abuses, and a
state's legal obligations to protect certain human rights).
[ 16:847
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Court on Human Rights ("IACtHR") possess the jurisdiction to hear
cases against Trinidad." Part III focuses on the scope of the death
penalty as practiced within the Inter-American system, and then
looks specifically at its application in Trinidad and Tobago. Part IV
analyzes particular cases before the IACHR that have been lodged by
Trinidadian citizens in order to highlight which state obligations are
being met and which ones are not being met by the Trinidadian gov-
ernment. Part V discusses the impact of the Trinidadian govern-
ment's actions on the due process rights of Trinidadian citizens, and
its impact within the Inter-American system.' Finally, Part VI pro-
vides specific recommendations to the Trinidadian government on
how to bring its domestic policies in conformity with its international
obligations. More significantly, it recommends ways for members of
the Inter-American community to strengthen the Inter-American
framework for the protection of human rights."
9. See infra Parts II.A-II.B (arguing that since the withdrawal from the
American Convention was not immediate, petitions lodged before May 28, 1999
fall within IACHR and IACtHR jurisdiction). Part 11 further asserts that the
IACHR remains competent to hear claims by Trinidadian citizens based on viola-
tions of the American Declaration. See id.
10. See infra Parts V.A-V.B (noting the failure of the Tnnidadian government
to comply with regional standards on human rights, and analyzing the effect this
has on due process guarantees).
11. See hifina Parts VI.A-VI.B (arguing for the need of a stronger regional hu-
man rights system); see also Dialogue on the Inter-.4merican Srstem or the Pro-
motion and Protection of Human Rights. OEA'ser. G CP CAJP-1610 00 rev. 2
(Apr. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Dialogue on the Inter-.4mnerican Sivsten] (observing
the need for strengthening the Inter-American human rights system, and calling for
measures that would achieve wider ratification of the region's most important hu-
man rights instruments-the American Convention and its two Protocols; the Con-
vention on Forced Disappearances of Persons: the Conv ention to Prevent and
Punish Torture; the Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence Against Women (Convention of Belkm do Par-i); and the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities)- Report vlthe
Inter-American Court of Hunan Rights to the Special Comnmttee on Inter-
American Summits Management, OEAiser. G CE, GCI-134 98 (Nlay 7, 1998),
available at http://www.summit-americas.orgiCEGCI o2ODocs-/ce-gct- 134-98-
English.htm (on file with AU ILR) (discussing the current contributions of the
IACtHR to the protection of human rights, including its mandate to apply and in-
terpret the American Convention, the power to issue advisory opinions to clanfy
the status of the law within the Inter-American system, and the ability to adopt
provisional measures to prevent a state from taking any action that would cause
"irreparable harm" to an individual whose case is either before the IACHR or the
2001]
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I. BACKGROUND: THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
In 1948, during the Ninth International Conference of American
States, the members of the Pan American Union'2 adopted the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man ("American
Declaration"),'3 the first of two major instruments that protect and
define human rights principles within the Inter-American system.'4
The second and more important of the two instruments, the Ameri-
can Convention,' 5 was adopted in 1969.16
Court itself); see also IACHR ANN. REP. 1999, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing the
IACHR's authority to request that the IACtHR adopt precautionary measures).
This Comment argues, however, that ratification of the relevant human rights in-
struments, and the current powers of the court, are not enough to guarantee protec-
tion of human rights, and that the IACtHR's jurisdiction must be expanded in order
to establish a stronger mechanism. See infra Parts VI.A-VI.B.
12. See SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 1-3
(1997) (stating that the Pan American Union was the precursor to the Organization
of American States).
13. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30-May
2, 1948, O.A.S. res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of
American States, Bogota, Columbia, OEA/ser. L/V/II.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948)
[hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in Basic Documents, supra note I
(adopting the American Declaration and setting forth the full text of the Declara-
tion). The rights of the individual are outlined in Chapter I of the American Decla-
ration, and include the right to life, liberty and personal security (Art. I); the right
to equality before the law (Art. II); the right to recognition of juridical personality
and civil rights (Art. XVII); the right to a fair trial (Art. XVIII); the right to petition
competent authorities and the right to a prompt decision (Art. XXIV); the right of
protection from arbitrary arrest (Art. XXV); and the right to due process of law
(Art. XXVI). Chapter II of the American Declaration stresses the individual's du-
ties to society, such as the individual's duty to obey the law (Art. XXXIII), and the
duty to serve the community and the nation (Art. XXXIV). See id.
14. See Inter-American Juridical Committee, Project of Declaration oJ the In-
ternational Rights and Duties of Man: Draft Declaration, in 19TH CONFERENCE OF
AMERICAN STATES (Pan American Union 1948) (setting forth the basic provisions
of the American Declaration, and aspiring to create a general framework of human
rights within the Inter-American system): SECRETARIAT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS,
GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVENTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, pt. II, 1
(F.V. Garcia-Amador ed., 1983) [hereinafter TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS] (not-
ing that the Inter-American human rights system began with the adoption of the
American Declaration in 1948); see also American Declaration, supra note 13
(setting forth the text of the American Declaration).
15. See TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS, supra note 14, at 47-51 (discussing the
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In order to further secure the rights defined in both the American
Declaration and the American Convention, the newly formed OAS
created two mechanisms to promote and safeguard human rights
within the Inter-American system: the IACHR and the IACtHR."
The LACHR was established primarily as a consultative organ to
promote and defend human rights'" by creating awareness of human
rights,19 making recommendations to member states on domestic
legislation favorable to human rights,'" preparing reports,2' and con-
ducting on-site observations.2- The IACtHR's main function is to in-
terpret and apply the provisions of the American Convention.!
This section discusses one of the remedies available to individuals
suffering from human rights abuses within the Inter-American sys-
tem, namely, the ability to petition the IACHR for redress." Fur-
preparatory work on the American Convention); American Convention, supra note
2 (setting forth the full text of the American Convention). The American Conven-
tion defines the civil and political rights of the individual, and includes the right to
juridical personality (Art. 3); the right to life (Art. 4); the fight to humane treatment
(Art. 5); the right to personal liberty (Art. 7): the right to a fair trial (Art. 8); free-
dom from ex postfacto laws (Art. 9); the right of reply (Art. 14), the right to equal
protection (Art. 24); and the right to judicial protection (Art. 25). See hi.
16. See generally David Harris, Regional Protection of Hunlan Rights: The In-
ter-American Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1, 1 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998) (examining the origins of
the Inter-American human fights system and the functions of the two regional
bodies in charge of administering the system).
17. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 99 (detailing the history and the functions
of the IACHR and the IACtHR).
18. See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 1
(Oct. 1979), reprinted in Basic Docunents, supra note 1 [hereinafter Statute of the
IACHR] (discussing the purpose for creating the IACHR).
19. See id. art. 18(a) (authorizing the Commission to promote increased con-
sciousness of human rights issues).
20. See id. art. 18(b) (empowering the Commission to suggest progressive hu-
man rights measures to States).
21. See id. art. 18(c) (authorizing the Commission to conduct studies and pre-
pare reports).
22. See id. art. 18(g) (enabling the Commission, upon consent of the State, to
conduct on-site observations).
23. See id. art. 1 (presenting the purpose of the IACtHR).
24. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-Anerican Human Rights Systeni: Estab-
lishing Precedents and Procedure in Hunian Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
2001]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
thermore, it examines OAS member state obligations under both the
American Declaration and the American Convention.
A. THE RIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO PETITION THE IACHR AND
THE IACTHR
Individual petitions directly to the IACtHR are not permitted." In-
stead, only the IACHR is authorized to receive petitions alleging
human rights abuses by OAS member states, 6 in violation of either
the American Declaration or the American Convention. This right
of petition extends to any individual, group of individuals, or non-
governmental entity within an OAS member state."8 Furthermore,
there is no requirement that the petitioner(s) personally experience
the human rights abuses to be able to initiate a complaint before the
IACHR.
29
The Regulations of the IACHR outline the conditions for admissi-
bility of a petition." One of the primary requirements for a petition's
L. REV. 297, 313-22 (1995) (reviewing the significance of the American Conven-
tion and the Inter-American human rights system for breaking with traditional
principles of international law and allowing individuals to have standing in an in-
ternational body to challenge the human rights record of a state).
25. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(1) (emphasizing that only
States Parties and the IACHR may submit cases to the IACtHR).
26. See Statute of the IACHR, supra note 18, art. 19 (empowering the Com-
mission to take action on petitions); see also Christina Cerna, The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights: Its Organization and Examination of Petitions and
Communications, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
16, at 65-114 (discussing generally the functions and powers of the IACHR).
27. See Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art.
26, approved Apr. 8, 1980, last modified May 3, 1996, reprinted in Basic Docut-
mnents, supra note 1, at 115 [hereinafter Regulations of the IACHR] (recognizing
that a violation of the American Declaration or the American Convention consti-
tutes a human rights abuse).
28. See id. (defining which entities are eligible to petition the IACHR); see also
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 44 (recognizing the ability of "any person
or group of persons, or any non-governmental entity legally recognized in one or
more member states" to petition the IACHR regarding human rights violations).
29. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 157 (explaining the inclusion of various
NGOs as complainants before the IACHR).
30. See Regulations of the IACHR, supra note 27, arts. 31-43, 51-54 (setting
forth the standards for admissibility of a petition against both a party to and a non-
signatory to the American Convention); see also American Convention, supra note
[16:847
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admissibility is the exhaustion of all domestic remedies before lodg-
ing a complaint with the lACHR." The petitioner must also observe a
strict time limit within which to file the complaint," and avoid dupli-
cation of procedures."
Once a complaint is lodged, the IACHR begins by initiating an in-
vestigation of the case, and completes its task by preparing a report
of its conclusions and recommendations. 4 The procedures for lodg-
ing complaints, however, differ according to whether they are com-
plaints brought under the American Convention against signatories to
the American Convention, or complaints brought under the Ameri-
can Declaration and the OAS Charter."
2, art. 46 (presenting the four requirements for lodging a petition before the
IACHR); DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 158 (explaining in detail the following four
requirements: exhaustion of domestic remedies, a six month time limit, non-
admittance of a petition at issue in another international forum, and the require-
ment that the petition contain the name, nationality, profession, domicile and sig-
nature of the person lodging the complaint).
31. See, e.g., In re Viviana Gallardo, Decision of Nov. 13, 1981, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. G101/81, para. 26, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1424 (1981) (emphasizing the pri-
macy of state sovereignty in international law, and explaining the rationale for the
exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement as providing the violator state with
an opportunity to redress the wrong before being taken before an international
body); Regulations of the IACHR, supra note 27, art. 37 (stating that the petitioner
must pursue all domestic legal remedies, but also recognizing that when the satis-
faction of this requirement becomes impossible to achieve-i.e., when the domes-
tic law does not afford due process of law, when the petitioner has been denied ac-
cess to domestic legal mechanisms and thus prevented from exhausting them, or
when there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering judgment-the petitioner is
no longer held to this requirement).
32. See Regulations of the IACHR. supra note 27. art. 38 (holding that after the
petitioner has availed himself of all domestic legal remedies, and after the final de-
cision has been rendered, he will have six months to petition the IACHR).
33. See id. art. 39 (explaining that no petitions will be allowed if the petitioner
has already lodged a complaint with another international body or if a similar peti-
tion has already been lodged with the IACHR).
34. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Preliminary Objections Bet ore the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights: Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate Tacties, 40 V.A. J. INT'L
L. 1, 15 (1999) (describing the procedures for processing individual applications);
see also Regulations of the IACHR, supra note 27. arts. 34, 36, 44-53 (providing
the procedural requirements for the initial processing of petitions, examination of
the case by the IACHR through on-site investigations and fact-finding missions,
and the issuance of a report on the findings).
35. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 176 (stating that if the petition was lodged
2001]
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A complaint based on the American Declaration does not require
the IACHR to propose friendly settlement, and allows only for the
limited investigation and issuance of a report containing only non-
binding recommendations."6 Under an American Convention com-
plaint, however, the IACHR has an obligation to encourage the in-
volved parties to reach a friendly settlement." If the parties to the
dispute are unable to agree to a friendly settlement, and the involved
member state has consented to the contentious jurisdiction of the
court," the IACHR then has the option of referring the petition ' 9 to
under the American Convention, the IACHR is required to attempt friendly settle-
ment, but if it was lodged under the Charter and the American Declaration,
friendly settlement is not necessary); see also Regulations of the IACHR, supra
note 27, arts. 51-53 (recognizing that, with respect to states not a party to the
American Convention, the IACHR may request information from governments in-
volved, transmit the charges lodged against a government to that government.
separate or combine cases, declare the complaint inadmissible, and conduct a
hearing to verify facts). After this process is completed, the IACHR shall issue and
then publish a final decision with its recommendations if the accused government
refuses to comply with the recommendations. See id. art. 53.; Statute of the
IACHR, supr-a note 18, arts. 18, 20 (providing that, with respect to members of the
OAS and states not a party to the American Convention, the IACHR shall have the
power to develop awareness of human rights issues, make recommendations to
OAS member states concerning domestic human rights legislation, issue reports in
the execution of its duties, request information dealing with human rights issues
from OAS member states, respond to inquiries made by the General Secretariat of
any OAS member state, conduct on-site inspections and observations in any OAS
member state, pay attention to the observance of human rights by OAS member
states as outlined in the American Declaration, examine any communications sub-
mitted to it, and make recommendations to any member state not a party to the
American Convention concerning more effective implementation of human rights
policies).
36. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 176 (discussing the manner in which the
IACHR is to settle disputes, depending on the legal basis for the complaint).
37. See Regulations of the IACHR, supra note 27, art. 45 (outlining the appli-
cable procedures for a friendly settlement proceeding, including the establishment
of a Special Commission to oversee the proceedings).
38. See Statute of the IACHR, supra note 18, art. 19(c); see also American
Convention, supra note 2, art. 62(3) (noting that the IACtHR's ability to hear a
case depends on whether the member state involved has consented, either condi-
tionally or unconditionally, to the court's jurisdiction).
39. See DAVIDSON, supra note 12, at 118 (discussing the significance of the
fact that Charter based petitions are resolved with the issuance of a report and no
other compensation or remedy. while American Convention based petitions are
either sent to the IACtHR for resolution or disposed of by the IACHR itself).
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the IACtHR.0O The IACtHR's decision is final," and can include ap-
propriate remedies under Article 63(1) of the American Conven-
- 4 2
tion. If, however, the state is not a party to the American Conven-
tion, the IACHR may not refer the case to the IACtHR.'
B. STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM:
THE AMERICAN DECLARATION V. THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
Although the American Declaration is not, per se, legally bind-
ing," the IACtHR has held that the fundamental rights guaranteed in
the OAS Charter45 are those rights enshrined in the American Decla-
ration, and that the American Declaration confers certain human
rights obligations upon all OAS member states." Under this existing
legal framework, every OAS member state clearly has an obligation
40. See American Convention, supra note 2. art. 51 (stating that the IACHR
may submit cases to the IACtHR for its consideration).
41. See id. art. 67 (providing that IACHR decisions are final and cannot be ap-
pealed).
42. See id. art. 63(1) (allowing remedies such as requiring the state party to
provide the aggrieved citizen his deprived rights, and requiring the state to pay fair
compensation). See generally Thomas Buergenthal, The .4dvtsori Practice oJthe
Inter-American Hunzan Rights Court, 79 AM. J. IN'T'L L. 1 (1985) (discussing gen-
erally the functions and powers of the IACtHR).
43. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 62 (noting that the Court's ju-
risdiction is limited to interpretation and application of the American Convention).
44. See American Declaration, supra note 13, pmbl. (stressing that the princi-
ples enshrined in the Declaration were to serve only as a guide to the "'evolving
American law").
45. See Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, pmbl.,
arts. 3(1), 17, 106, 2 U.S.T. 2394, U.N.T.S. 48, http:,, \%.cidh.oas.org basic
[hereinafter OAS Charter] (referring to the fundamental rights of man and the indi-
vidual). The OAS Charter, however, does not define these fundamental rights. In-
stead, it states in Article 106 that the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights is the primary body charged with promoting and protecting human rights.
See id. art. 106; see also HARRIS, supra note 16. at 6 (asserting that the IACHR
fundamentally applies the American Declaration "as an indirectly binding legal
text."); Statute of the IACHR, supra note 18, art. 1 (defining human rights to mean
those enshrined in both the American Declaration and the American Convention).
46. See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/90. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para. 45 (1989) [herein-
after Advisory Op.: American Declaration/Article 64] (explaining that the Ameri-
can Declaration defines human rights in the OAS Charter).
2001] 857
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
to respect the human rights of its citizens guaranteed by the Ameri-
can Declaration.47
The American Convention, as distinguished from the American
Declaration, is a binding treaty.48 Although Article 78(1) provides
that States Parties may denounce the American Convention, Article
78(2) clearly holds that a state's obligations with respect to the Con-
vention do not automatically dissipate when that state withdraws rati-
fication . Accordingly, all petitions submitted to the IACHR prior to
a denunciation of the American Convention are valid, and a de-
nouncing state is responsible for all of its prior obligations under the
American Convention."
II. CONTINUING TRINIDADIAN OBLIGATIONS
WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
When Trinidad's withdrawal from the American Convention be-
47. See American Declaration, supra note 13, ch. I (outlining individual rights,
which include the "right to a fair trial" and the right to "petition any competent
authority").
48. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 74 (providing that the Ameri-
can Convention enters into force when a state ratifies it); Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 11, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention] (defining "signature" and "ratification" of a treaty to be a state's pri-
mary method of expressing its consent to be legally bound by that treaty); see also
HARRIS, supra note 16, at 8-13 (stating that, according to the Vienna Convention
Article 33(4), the interpretation of a treaty that always prevails is the one that "is
most consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention," and concluding
that the American Convention was intended to be binding upon States Parties to
the Convention).
49. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 78(2) (holding that states are
not immune from obligations with respect to any actions in violation of the Ameri-
can Convention occurring before a denunciation).
50. See IACHR ANN. REP. 1999, supra note 3, at 1363-64 (noting several peti-
tions lodged by Trinidadian citizens prior to the effective date of withdrawal from
the American Convention on May 28, 1999, and concluding that because the peti-
tions were admissible, Trinidad was liable for its obligations under the American
Convention before its withdrawal). Despite Trinidad's intent to withdraw from the
American Convention, the IACHR chose to continue accepting cases from Trini-
dadian citizens claiming violations of the American Convention, demonstrating
that until May 28, 1999, Trinidad was fully liable for its obligations under the
American Convention. See id. (stating that since Trinidad is a party to the Ameri-
can Convention, the Commission was competent to review petitions from Trini-
dadian citizens).
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came effective, an important issue was whether the currently avail-
able remedies within the Inter-American system were closed off to
Trinidadian citizens, denying them important due process guaran-
tees. " This section discusses the remaining jurisdiction of the
IACHR to hear petitions from Trinidadian citizens, and to refer
Trinidadian cases to the IACtHR in the aftermath of the govern-
ment's withdrawal from the American Convention.' It will then
highlight the continuing obligations of the Trinidadian government
by examining some of the current cases before the IACHR and the
IACtHR 3
A. IACHR COMPETENCE
Under its statute, the IACHR retains certain limited functions and
powers with respect to states not a party to the American Conven-
tion. While the procedures remain virtually the same for petitions
involving States Parties to the American Convention, the IACHR's
powers with respect to non-signatories are limited to non-binding
51. See American Convention, supra note 2. arts. 8(2)(h), 25 (defining due
process guarantees to include the right to appeal to a higher court and the right to
obtain judgment from "competent" authorities), in/i-a note 152 and accompanying
text (recognizing that judicial inefficiency and corruption are prevalent in Carib-
bean nations, and that these characteristics may sometimes hinder due process
guarantees).
52. See supra Part I (discussing the jurisdiction of the IACHR and the IACtHR
to hear Trinidadian petitions); see also IACTHR REP. TO GEN.. ASSEMB. 1999, sit-
pra note 5, at 34 (describing Trinidad's denunciation of the American Convention
as unprecedented, but recognizing that it does not relieve the state from its obliga-
tion to comply with provisional measures issued by the IACtHR). The IACtHR
also went on to recognize that, "even when an international treaty ... [gives] the
right of denunciation, in dealing with human rights treaties, due to their special
nature, a denunciation affects the respective international or regional system for the
protection of human rights as a whole." Id. See generally Christina M. Cerna,
Symposium: International Law in the Americas - Rethinking National Sovereignty
in an Age of Regional Integration - International Law and the Protection of Hu-
man Rights in the Inter-American System, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 731, 74148 (1997)
(discussing generally the "binding" effects of the American Declaration on OAS
members).
53. See infra notes 77-79 (discussing the Trinidad Cases before the IACHR
and the IACtHR).
54. See Pasqualucci, supra note 34, at 51 (explaining the effect on junsdic-
tional issues when States denounce the treaty).
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recommendations.'5 Furthermore, the IACHR cannot refer such peti-
tions alleging violations of the American Convention to the
IACtHR.16 In cases where the member state involved is not a signa-
tory to the American Convention, the IACHR will only entertain
claims of violations of the American Declaration.1
7
Although the American Declaration does not specifically protect
against capital punishment, Article I provides for the right to life,
liberty, and the security of person.5" In interpreting the Article I
"right to life" standard, however, the IACHR has applied the concept
ofjus cogens." In a 1981 case involving the United States' applica-
tion of the death penalty, the IACHR recognized the existence of the
jus cogens principle in the Inter-American system that prohibited the
55. See Statute of the IACHR, supra note 18, art. 20 (discussing the compe-
tence of the Commission with respect to states not a party to the American Con-
vention).
56. See id. art. 2 (establishing that the IACtHR's advisory and adjudicatory ju-
risdiction is governed by Articles 61-64 of the American Convention). Section two
of the American Convention describes the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, and notes
that only state parties and the IACHR are allowed to submit cases to the court. See
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61. Furthermore, the American Conven-
tion requires that the state party involved accept the jurisdiction of the court, and
states that the court will accept only cases related to the interpretation and applica-
tion of the American Convention. See id. arts. 62-63.
57. See Statute of the IACHR, supra note 18, art. 20(a) (stating that when the
state party involved is not a party to the American Convention, the IACHR is em-
powered to consider violations of the American Declaration); see also Case
12.086, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 190, 194 (1999) (available via http://www.oas.org) (de-
nying jurisdiction to address petitioners' American Convention claims because the
Bahamas was not a signatory to the Convention); Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25,
43, OEA/ser. L./VII.54, doc. rev. 1 (1981) (holding that since the United States is
not a State party to the American Convention, it cannot be in violation of Article
4(5) of the Convention because "it would be impossible to impose upon the United
States Government or that of any other State member of the OAS, by means of
'interpretation,' an international obligation based upon a treaty that such state has
not duly accepted or ratified.").
58. See American Declaration, supra note 13, art. I (listing a broad range of
"rights" in Articles 1-28).
59. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para. 54, OEA/ser. L./V./Il.71, doe. 9
rev. 1 (1987) (definingjus cogens to be a "superior order of legal norms, which the
laws of man or nations may not contravene."). Basically, these legal norms are
those norms that have been accepted either expressly by treaty or tacitly through
customary practices, and are designed to protect public interest and public moral-
ity. See id.
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application of the death penalty against juveniles.' Further, the
IACHR asserted that the diversity in practice within the individual
states of the United States resulted in different sentencing for the
commission of the same crime, and concluded that such disparate
practices resulted in an arbitrary application of the death penalty."'
For the reasons stated above, the IACHR held that the United States
had violated the American Declaration.":
After making the determination that a particular state has violated
the American Declaration, the Commission must monitor compli-
ance. 63 Article l(2)(b) of the IACHR statute states that the IACHR
has the authority to administer the American Declaration with re-
spect to all OAS member states not a party to the American Conven-
tion.64 In the aftermath of its withdrawal from the American Conven-
tion, it is clear that Trinidad will continue to have certain human
rights obligations under the American Declaration."'
The American Declaration guarantees every individual the right to
• 66 • 6
life, the right to a fair trial, the right to petition competent authori-
60. See id. para. 55 (explaining that even the United States, in its petition to the
IACHR, noted a general legal norm recognized by the member States of the OAS
that the death penalty should not be applied to juveniles, and pointing to the fact
that many U.S. states had in fact outlawed the death penalty as applied to juve-
niles).
61. See id. paras. 59-60 (holding that the age distinction between jueniles and
adults in that case was not dispositive of the issue, and applying the general princi-
ple ofjus cogens to the death penalty with respect to both categories).
62. See id. para. 62 (stating that the United States federal government's failure
to normalize the law on the death penalty in each state resulted in 'a pattern of
legislative arbitrariness throughout the United States which results in the arbitrary
deprivation of life and inequality before the law, contrary to Articles I and I1 of the
American Declaration...").
63. See Harris, supra note 16, at 8 (explaining that a 1979 amendment to the
IACHR statute reinforced authority to monitor compliance with the American
Convention).
64. See Statute of the IACHR, supra note 18, art. 1(2)(b (linking membership
in the OAS with human rights obligations under the American Declaration).
65. See Advisory Op.: American Declaration Article 64, supra note 46, paras.
39-43 (discussing the American Declaration as having a legal effect upon OAS
member states).
66. See American Declaration, supra note 13. art. 1. see also Case 10.675, In-
ter-Am. C.H.R. 295, 351-354 DEA/Ser.L./V/II.95 Doc. 7 re'. (1997) (affirming
the right to life standard in Article 1 of the American Declaration, and holding the
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ties, 6 and the right to due process of law.69 As a member state of the
OAS, and under the IACHR statute, an individual Trinidadian citizen
has the right to lodge a complaint alleging human rights abuses
against the government to the IACHR.7"
B. IACtHR COMPETENCE
The IACtHR applies and interprets the provisions of the American
Convention."' It can only accept cases referred by the IACHR or
submitted by a state party to the same Convention." Once a state has
accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, however, the American
Convention fails to supply any provisions regarding the process to
withdraw that acceptance.' For example, in determining the validity
of Peru's attempt to withdraw from the IACtHR's jurisdiction in
1999, the IACtHR held that the only acceptable method to accom-
plish such a withdrawal was to completely renounce the American
Convention. 4 The effect of the withdrawal from the American Con-
United States to be in violation of the American Declaration when it refused to
grant asylum to Haitian refugees who were consequently killed upon their return to
Haiti).
67. See id. art. 18.
68. See id. art. 24.
69. See id. art. 26.
70. See Statute of the IACHR, supra note 18, arts. 18, 20 (discussing the com-
petence of the IACHR to hear petitions from citizens of non-signatories to the
American Convention).
71. See id. art. I (identifying the IACtHR as a "consultative organ" to the OAS,
which advises and consults on human rights as they are defined in the American
Convention and the American Declaration).
72. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61 (noting the parties that
have standing to file a case in this court).
73. See id. art. 62(1) (stating that a party may submit to the court's jurisdiction
only after it signs or ratifies the American Convention); Ivcher Bronstein Case,
Judgement of Sept. 24, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 355, 365, OEA/Ser. GCP/doc.
3285/00 (2000) (recognizing that the only provision in the American Convention
dealing specifically with the IACtHR's jurisdiction is one that describes how a
state can accept jurisdiction, and pointing out that no mention is made of how to
renounce the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction).
74. See id. at 367-68 (declaring that a State may not release itself from the
court's jurisdiction by renouncing parts of the American Convention; rather, in or-
der to be released from the court's jurisdiction, the State must renounce the Ameri-
can Convention as a whole).
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vention, however, is not immediate." Subsequently. a state consent-
ing to the jurisdiction of the IACtHR remains legally obligated to
recognize the court's jurisdiction until the date that the withdrawal
becomes effective.76 Under this ruling, Trinidad remains bound under
both the American Convention and the IACtHR's jurisdiction for
cases brought before May 26, 1999 and for violations of the Ameri-
can Convention occurring before the effective date of withdrawal
from the Convention. As such, the Trinidadian government's con-
tinuing obligations under the American Convention include the pro-
tection of the right to life,' and the observance of restrictions on the
death penalty.79
The following section is a preliminary discussion of the death pen-
alty within the Inter-American system."" It traces death penalty juris-
prudence in the Inter-American system, and outlines death penalty
practices in Trinidad and Tobago in order to highlight the govern-
ment's conformity, as well as nonconformity, with both its domestic
law and its Inter-American obligations."
75. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 78 (explaining that notice of
withdrawal must be given one year in advance and must be made to all parties).
76. See Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 56(2) (describing default pro-
cedures when a treaty does not provide for termination or withdraalh; lvcher
Bronstein Case, Judgement of Sept. 24, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 355. 368-69,
OEA/Ser. G CP/doc. 3285/00 (2000) (remarking that the rules of international law
preclude an immediate release from the IACtHR's jurisdiction because Article
56(2) of the Vienna Convention requires a state to give at least twelve months no-
tice of its plan to withdraw from a treaty).
77. See supra Part II (discussing the continuing obligations of the Trinidadian
government, notwithstanding its withdrawal from the Amencan Convention).
78. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 4 (defining the nght to life
guaranteed under the American Convention).
79. See id. art. 4(2) (defining the restrictions on the application of the death
penalty).
80. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS. INTERNATIO\AL LAW AND
ABOLITtON OF THE DEATH PENALTY 800-08 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997)
(outlining, in general, the status of death penalty law within the Inter-American
system).
81. See generally Pratt v. Att'y Gen. for Jam., [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 6-19 (P.C.
1993) (discussing due process requirements with respect to both Trinidad and To-
bago and Jamaica); see also Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107, 12.126, and 12.146,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 918, 967 (2000) (available via http:, www.oas.org) (discussing
the due process requirements under the American Convention with respect to death
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III. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM
While the American Convention does not forbid the imposition of
the death penalty,82 other sections of the American Convention, as
well as the jurisprudence of the IACHR and the IACtHR, demon-
strate that states within the Inter-American system are strictly regu-
lated with respect to the administration of the death penalty." The re-
strictions imposed on the application of the death penalty and the
standard used to review such cases reflect a strong trend within the
Inter-American system toward abolition of this form of punishment. 4
penalty cases).
82. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 4(2) (providing: "[l]n coun-
tries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed only for the most
serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and
in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the com-
mission of the crime.").
83. See id. art. 4(3)-4(6) (forbidding: (1) the reinstatement of the death penalty
in states that have already abolished it; (2) states from imposing capital punishment
for "political offenses or related common crimes"; (3) the imposition of the death
penalty on pregnant women and anyone under 18 or over 70). The Convention also
restricts the imposition of the death penalty while a petition for amnesty is pend-
ing, and allows anyone on death row to apply for amnesty. See id.; see also 1987
INTER-AM. Y.B. ON H.R. (OAS) 492-94 [hereinafter 1987 INTER-AM. Y.B.] (not-
ing the IACHR's conclusion that the death penalty has been counterproductive,
and expressing the intention to join the "universal trend toward abolition of the
death penalty."); Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abol-
ish the Death Penalty [hereinafter Protocol to the American Convention], reprinted
in Basic Documents, supra note 1, pmbl. (expressing the intention not to apply the
death penalty in the Americas because it has "irrevocable consequences, forecloses
the correction of judicial error, and precludes the possibility of changing or reha-
bilitating those convicted."); Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4)
of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. para. 55 (1983) [hereinafter Advisory Op. on the Death Penalty]
(limiting those states that have not abolished the death penalty to complying with
"certain procedural requirements, such as imposing the death penalty only for the
most serious common crimes," and taking into account the specific situation of
each individual in applying the death penalty).
84. See generally Protocol to the American Convention, supra note 83, pmbl.
(expressing the intention of the States Parties of the American Convention to adopt
an instrument to stop the use of the death penalty in the Americas); SCHABAS, su-
pra note 80, 261-62 (discussing the abolitionist movement within the Inter-
American system). Schabas notes, however, that the movement is not unanimous.
See id. at 262 (pointing to the "enthusiastic retentionist" states that refuse to abol-
ish the death penalty, including the United States, Jamaica, and Trinidad and To-
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A. THE STANDARD FOR REVIEWING DEATH PENALTY CASES
The IACHR most recently outlined the standard for reviewing
death penalty cases in McKenzie v. Jamaica " and Baptiste v. Gre-
nada.86 In these two decisions, the IACHR reaffirmed its view that
the right to life is paramount. 1" As such, when reviewing cases deal-
ing with the right to life or the deprivation of that right,"" the Com-
mission applies a "heightened scrutiny" test." This test enables the
IACHR to align its practices with its abolitionist beliefs, to strictly
review the denial of the right to life, and to ensure strict compliance
with the provisions of the American Convention.'
Even though the JACHR is competent to review alleged human
rights abuses perpetrated by States Parties to the American Conven-
tion, it is not completely unrestricted when reviewing the decisions
of domestic courts. "' The "fourth instance formula," developed and
used in past JACHR cases, holds that the Commission may not re-
view judgments of competent domestic courts that have accorded the
bago).
85. See Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107. 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 967-68 (2000) (available via http://www.oas.org) (defining the legal standard
for reviewing death penalty cases).
86. See Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 721. 738 (2000) (available via
http://www.oas.org) (defining the legal standard for reviewing death penalty cases
as a "heightened level of scrutiny").
87. See id. at 738 (recognizing that the right to life is the "'supreme right of the
human being.").
88. See Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 295, 350-54, OEA Ser.L. V/11.95, doc.
7 rev. (1997) (reaffirming that Article I of the American Declaration confers an
obligation on States Parties to the OAS to protect the right to life, and holding that
the United States violated this obligation by allowing the refugees to return to
Haiti).
89. See Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107. 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 967 n.63 (2000) (available via http:i/'www..oas.org) (quoting a United Nations
Human Rights Commission's decision, Baboheram-Adhin et al. v. Suriname,
which held that "the lav must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which
a person may be deprived of his life by the authorities of a State.").
90. See Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 721, 739 (2000) (available via
http://wvww.oas.org) (advocating a gradual approach in order to completely abolish
the death penalty).
91. See, e.g., Case 11.673, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 76, 86, OEA Ser.L. V 11.95, doc.
7 rev (1997) (discussing the restricting scope of the "fourth instance formula" that
the IACHR is bound to apply in all cases).
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complainant's proper judicial guarantees. 92 In both McKenzie and
Baptiste, however, the IACHR specifically addressed this issue, and
held that the fourth instance formula does not automatically bar the
heightened scrutiny test applied to death penalty cases. " In other
words, the IACHR made a distinction between the decision to im-
pose the death penalty as part of an OAS member state's domestic
law, and the application of the death penalty in conformity with the
rights protected under the American Convention.94
B. THE DEATH PENALTY IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
The Trinidadian Constitution provides for the imposition of the
death penalty. 95 In De Freitas v. Benny,96 for example, the British
Privy Council ("Privy Council" or "PC") - the highest Court of Ap-
peal for Caribbean states - upheld the Trinidadian government's im-
position of the death penalty for murder, arguing that common law
traditions at the time the Constitution entered into force permitted the
- 97
practice.
In 1993, however, the Privy Council issued Pratt v. Attornev Gen-
92. See id. (defining the "fourth instance formula" and recognizing that in re-
viewing cases, the mere allegation of an unjust or incorrect judgment is not suffi-
cient to allow the IACHR to consider the case). The IACHR is careful not to act as
an appellate court. See id.
93. See Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107, 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 968 (2000) (available via http://www.oas.org) (holding that the fourth in-
stance formula does not prevent the Commission's review of a case where the alle-
gations present a possible violation of rights granted by the American Convention);
see also Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 721, 739 (2000) (available via
http://www.oas.org) (determining that, notwithstanding the fourth instance for-
mula, the Commission is permitted to review cases in potential violation of the
Convention).
94. See id. (stating that the Commission will apply a strict scrutiny analysis to
capital punishment cases in order to protect the right to life as set forth in the
American Convention).
95. See TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. art. 4(a) (authorizing the taking of life as
long as it is conducted along due process grounds).
96. [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C. 1975).
97. See id. at 246 (holding that death by hanging was authorized by common
law at the time of the entry into force of the Trinidadian Constitution, and was thus
permissible).
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eralfor Jamaica," a decision that would have profound effects on
the execution of death sentences in Trinidad and Tobago." Under
this decision, the Privy Council set a five-year time limit for carrying
out the death penalty, and held that significant delays over that time
limit amounted to cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment.""
Following this decision, any prisoner who had been on death row for
over five years automatically had his sentence commuted to life in
prison.'0 ' Since 1993, the Trinidadian government has invoked the
Privy Council's decision in Pratt'"l as its explanation for imple-
menting death sentences against individuals with petitions before in-
ternational human rights commissions."" On January 27, 1999, how-
ever, in another highly controversial and unexpected decision, the
Privy Council stayed the executions of two death row inmates until
the pending applications before the IACHR had been resolved.""
This decision outraged the Trinidadian government, who argued that
it was contrary to the time limit set forth in Pratt for implementing
98. See Pratt v. Att', Gen. for Jam.. [1994] 2 A.C. 1.33-36 (P.C. 1993).
99. See Roget V. Bryan, Toward the Development of a Caribbean Jurisprt-
dence: The Case for Establishing a Caribbean Court of Appeal, 7 FLA. ST. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 181, 190 (1998) (observing that Pratt v.4ttv Gen. for
Jam. had the effect of commuting the death sentences of numerous inmates to life
imprisonment).
100. See Pratt, [1994] 2 A.C. at 33-36 (arguing that due process guarantees al-
low courts to permanently stay an execution when it has been delayed for too long
a period, and states that choose to administer the death penalty have an obligation
to administer it in a timely fashion).
101. See Bryan, supra note 99, at 190 (noting that at least fifty-three inmates had
their death sentences commuted to life imprisonment), see also Birdsong. supra
note 5, at 291 (describing the impact of the Pratt decision with respect to the
commutation of sentences).
102. Comnpare Pratt, [1994] 2 A.C. at 33-36 (arguing against delay in imple-
menting the death penalty), with Thomas v. Baptiste, [2000] 2 A.C. I (P.C. 1999)
(appeal taken from the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago) (staying the exe-
cutions of several appellants until the IACHR had issued a ruling on their peti-
tions).
103. See Notice to Denounce, supra note I (quoting the Pratt decision, which
held that any State that "wished to retain capital punishment must accept the re-
sponsibility of ensuring that execution followed as swiftly as practicable after sen-
tence, allowing a reasonable time for appeal and consideration of reprieve.").
104. See Thomas v. Baptiste, [2000] 2 A.C. I (P.C. 1999) (providing the expla-
nations for the January 1999 ruling staying the executions of Damn Roger Thomas
and Haniff Hilaire).
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executions.' °
A later explanation of the decision, however, revealed that the
Privy Council had ruled on due process grounds and not on the cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment issue in Pratt.0 6 In its explana-
tion, the Privy Council traced the history of the due process clause in
the Trinidadian Constitution,0 7 and argued that due process applies
not only to the trial process, but also to the appellate process.' 8 Fur-
thermore, the Privy Council rejected the Trinidadian government's
arguments that the American Convention provision allowing appeals
to the IACHR did not apply to due process guarantees under domes-
tic law. The Privy Council argued that the applicants were not trying
to enforce the provisions of the American Convention, but were sim-
ply trying to secure their due process rights as guaranteed under the
Trinidadian Constitution." Finally, the Privy Council recognized the
right of the government to withdraw rights it has granted, but stated
that those rights could not be taken away retrospectively without
violating due process guarantees.""
The disagreement with the Privy Council over the death penalty
105. See Birdsong, supra note 5, at 296 (quoting the Trinidadian Attorney Gen-
eral, who argued that the Privy Council's decision meant that the government
would have to wait indefinitely for an IACHR decision before being able to carry
out a lawful and constitutionally authorized exercise of state power).
106. See Thomas v. Baptiste, [2000] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C. 1999) (staying the execu-
tions on due process grounds, but denying the applicants' request for a commuta-
tion of sentence). The Privy Council held that the length of time the applicants had
been imprisoned did not exceed the time limit defined in Pratt, and that the appli-
cants' pre-trial delay in the instant case was not unreasonable. See id.
107. See TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. art. 5(2) (guaranteeing the right to a fair
hearing).
108. See Thomas v. Baptiste, [2000] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C. 1999) (holding that due pro-
cess allows for a convicted individual to participate in a legal process that has the
capability of commuting or reducing his sentence before an executive decision is
made).
109. See id. (recognizing the principle that treaties do not become binding unless
they are incorporated into the domestic law of a country). The Privy Council, how-
ever, opined: "[b]y ratifying a treaty which provides for individual access to an in-
ternational body, the government made that process... a part of the domestic
criminal justice system and thereby . . . extended the scope of the due process
clause in the Constitution." Id.
110. See id. (noting that section 4(a) of the Trinidadian Constitution prevented
the government from curtailing rights retrospectively).
[16:847868
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
issue has spurred the Caribbean nations, led by the Trinidadian gov-
ernment, to develop their own Caribbean Court of Appeal to bypass
the Privy Council."' Trinidad's withdrawal from the American Con-
vention, combined with the fact that review by the IACtHR is no
longer possible, makes it more than likely that the establishment of
such a court will work to the detriment of those citizens wishing to
appeal their cases to international bodies if that court becomes the
court of final appeal."-
2
The next section of this Comment examines the reports, cases, and
decisions of both the IACHR and the lACtHR to highlight the rights
guaranteed to Trinidadian citizens on death row under the American
Convention."3
111. See Caribbean Leaders to Create Regional Crininal Court. Do%%' JONES
INT'L NEWS SERV., July 3, 1999, WL, ALLNE\WSPLUS file (supporting the es-
tablishment of a Caribbean Appeals Court); see also Bryan, supra note 99, at 181
(detailing the reasons behind the move for a Caribbean Criminal Court, but noting
that judicial independence is not necessarily guaranteed and that the cost of access
if the Court were located in one country would be a significant obstacle for liti-
gants).
112. But see Bryan, supra note 99, at 188 (arguing against the maintenance of
the Privy Council as the court of last resort in the Caribbean because the decisions
of the Council are insensitive to the needs and the local practices of the Caribbean
countries). Bryan also explains that the movement toward the establishment of the
Caribbean Court of Appeals has prompted some countries, such as Trinidad, to opt
out of international human rights commissions. See id. at 212. Notwithstanding the
important implications the Caribbean Court of Appeals has to the sovereign inde-
pendence of Caribbean nations, however, the establishment of such a regional
Court could significantly increase the use of the death penalty in the Caribbean.
See Birdsong, supra note 5, at 288 (noting that the establishment of a Caribbean
Court of Appeals could result in more liberal and unrestricted administration of
capital punishment).
113. See generally Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107. 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 918 (2000) (available via http://www.oas.org) (discussing several court
cases dealing with Trinidadian citizens on death row); Case 11.743, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 721 (2000) (available via http://www.oas.org) (discussing claims of Ameri-
can Convention violations with respect to the application of the death penalty and
the rights of death row "victims").
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW WITHIN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM AND ITS APPLICATION TO
THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO CASES
Between 1998 and May 28, 1999, over twenty Trinidadian citizens
petitioned the IACHR, complaining that Trinidad had violated their
rights under the American Convention (at the time, still in force)." 4
In each of those cases, the IACHR claimed jurisdiction and deter-
mined that the petitions were admissible." ' The following sections
analyze the petitions of the Trinidadian citizens in light of past
IACHR and IACtHR jurisprudence, to determine whether the Trini-
dadian government has violated its continuing obligations under the
American Convention.'
6
A. THE TRINIDADIAN CASES BEFORE THE IACHR
Although the IACHR's reports and pleadings are kept secret ini-
tially, ' 7 analysis of past IACHR reports shows that when the Com-
mission scrutinizes death penalty cases, it pays special attention to
the requirements of due process and judicial protection in death pen-
alty cases." 8 Recently, the Commission held that an individual's due
114. See Cases 12.005, 12.042, 12.052, 11.815, 11.854, 11.837, 11.816, 11.855,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1998, 1999) (available via http://www.oas.org) (alleging viola-
tions of Article 4 (the right to life), Article 5 (the right to humane treatment), Arti-
cle 7 (the right to personal liberty), Article 8 (the right to a fair trial), Article 24
(the right to equal protection before the law), and Article 25 (the right to judicial
protection) of the American Convention).
115. See generally id. (analyzing the different criteria for admissibility, and de-
termining that, in all cases, the petitions demonstrated exhaustion of domestic
remedies, timely filing, and lack of duplication).
116. See supra Part II (discussing the continuing obligations that the Trinidadian
government has under the American Convention).
117. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 50 (stating that the IACHR
report is first transmitted to the state party concerned, and that the report may not
be published). Only after the IACHR has made its recommendations available to
the state party concerned, and given the state three months to comply, can the
Commission make the decision to publish the report. See id. art. 51.
118. See Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107, 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 967 (2000) (available via http://www.oas.org) (stating that the IACHR must
apply a heightened level of scrutiny in capital punishment cases). Furthermore, the
IACHR follows the principle that any State Party that applies the death penalty
"[must] comply strictly with the provisions of the Convention, including.., the
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process guarantees under Article 8 of the Convention permit that in-
dividual to question the appropriateness of his or her sentence.'
Furthermore, the Commission defines an individual's due process
guarantees under Article 25 of the American Convention (the right to
recourse) as the right to petition an international tribunal for an ob-
jective and neutral judicial investigation.'"
In the case of Trinidadian petitioners to the IACHR, it is signifi-
cant to note that the Trinidadian Constitution does not forbid the im-
position of the death penalty.'2' In such cases, the Commission must
also decide whether the death penalty, as administered in each of the
cases submitted, is consistent with the provisions of the American
Convention.22 According to the IACHR, the imposition of a manda-
tory death penalty sentence violates Article 4(1) of the American
Convention because it does not allow review':' or consideration of an
individual's specific circumstances before sentencing. 24 When the
right to life .... the guarantees of humane treatment ... , and the due process and
judicial protections guaranteed under Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention." Id.; see
also American Convention, supra note 2, art. 25 (holding that all individuals have
a right to a remedy in court when his or her fundamental rights have been violated,
regardless of whether these violations were committed by individuals acting wvithin
their official duties).
119. See Cases 12.023, 12.044. 12.107, 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 980-81 (2000) (available via http:.,iwww.oas.org) (stating that due process
also includes the right of effective review of a death sentence).
120. See Case 11.743, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 721. 767 (2000) (available via
http://www.oas.org) (defining the right to recourse under Article 25 of the Amen-
can Convention to include petitions to tribunals).
121. See TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. art. 4(a) (guaranteeing the right to life and the
right not to be deprived of that right except by due process of law).
122. See Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107, 12.126. and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 975 (2000) (available via http://wwwv.oas.org) (stating that the Commission
"must determine whether the practice of imposing the death penalty through man-
datory sentencing is compatible with the terms of Articles 4, 5 and 8 of the Con-
vention, and the principles underlying those provisions."); see also Thomas v.
Baptiste, [2000] 2 A.C. I (P.C. 1999) (noting that Section 4 of Trinidad's Offences
Against the Person Act establishes a mandatory death sentence for murder).
123. See Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107, 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 979 (2000) (available via http://ww.oas.org) (emphasizing that the imposi-
tion of mandatory death sentences effectively bars higher courts from revewing
the appropriateness of each sentence).
124. See id. at 977 (arguing that a mandatory death sentence prohibits case-by-
case review when determining whether a death sentence is an appropriate punish-
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death penalty is applied in this manner, an individual may be arbi-
trarily deprived of life, in violation of Article 4(1) of the American
Convention. 25 Under this reasoning, the IACHR could conclude that
Trinidad is in violation of the American Convention.
While the individual petitions by the Trinidadian citizens were
being considered by the IACHR, the Commission requested that the
IACtHR adopt certain provisional measures ' to refrain from exe-
cuting those people who had petitions before the IACHR. 2 7 Despite
the resulting IACtHR order,2 8 the Trinidadian government executed
at least three of the petitioners.' 29 Following Trinidad's continuing
defiance of the IACtHR order and its obligations under the American
Convention, the IACHR submitted twenty-three different cases, in-
cluding Hilaire'"° and Constantine"' ("the Trinidad cases") to the
ment).
125. See id.
126. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 63(2) (stating that in certain
situations of "extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irrepara-
ble damage. . ..." the court is authorized to "adopt such provisional measures as it
deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration."). If, however, the case is
not yet before the IACtHR, the IACHR may request the adoption of provisional
measures. See id.
127. See, e.g., IACtHR Court Order, supra note 5, at 317-27 (ordering Trinidad
to stay the executions of petitioners to the IACHR and submit proof of compliance,
and summoning Trinidad to a public hearing on the issue).
128. See supra Part II.B (discussing the jurisdiction of the IACt-IR over the
Trinidadian government, and noting the continuing Trinidadian obligations to re-
spect IACtHR decisions and rulings).
129. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the various executions
carried out by the Trinidadian government in violation of the IACtHR Order to
stay the executions).
130. See IACHR ANN. REP. 1999, supra note 3, at 1375-76 (noting that Case
11.816, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1375 (1999), was submitted to the IACtHR on May 26,
1999).
131. See id. at 1376 (stating that the IACHR had submitted to the IACtIR
twenty-three consolidated cases against Trinidad for violations of Articles 4, 5, and
8 of the American Convention). The consolidated cases are Cases 11.787 (George
Constantine), 11.814 (Wenceslaus James), 11.840 (Denny Baptiste), 11.851
(Clarence Charles), 11.853 (Keiron Thomas), 11.855 (Anthony Garcia), 12.005
(Wilson Prince), 12.021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12.042 (Mervyn Edmund),
12.043 (Samuel Winchester), 12.052 (Martin Reid), 12.072 (Rodney Davis),
12.073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12.075 (Noel Seepersad), 12.076 (Wayne Mat-
thews), 12.082 (Alfred Frederick), 12.093 (Natasha De Leon), 12.111 (Vijay Mun-
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IACtHR.3 2 The IACHR took this action only after considering the
individual petitions in full, and after efforts to reach friendly settle-
ment had failed. 3 A decision is not expected on those case until late
2001 or early 2002.'A
B. THE CASE BEFORE THE LACTHR: PRELIMINARY PROJECTIONS
In addition to being a party to the American Convention when the
petitions were filed, Trinidad also submitted itself to the IACtHR's
compulsory jurisdiction under Article 62 of the American Conven-
tion."' As such, the JACtHR must resolve the issue of whether Trini-
dad's procedures for arrest, detention, conviction and imposition of a
mandatory death sentence violate Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 25 of the
American Convention.3 Before the IACtHR can proceed to the
groo), 12.112 (Philip Chotalal), 12.129 (Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah,
12.137 (Nigel Mark), 12.140 (Wilberforce Bernard), and 12.141 (Steve Mungroo).
See id.
132. See e-mail from the Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights, (June 20, 2000, 07:30 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter e-mail
Correspondence with IACHR] (disclosing that the IACHR had taken the Trini-
dadian petitions to the IACtHR. but noting that all pleadings and documents were
to be kept private under order by the Court), see also IACHR ANN. REP. 1999, sui-
pra note 3, at 25 (listing the cases submitted in that year to the IACtHR).
133. See Letter from Hern.n Salgado-Pesantes, President of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights to Basdeo Panday. Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago,
(Aug. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Letter to Panday], reprinted in ANN. REP. OF THE
INTER-AM. CT. ON H.R. (1998) [hereinafter IACTHR ANN. REP. 1998] (highlight-
ing one of the many refusals of the Trinidadian government to respond to efforts
by the IACHR and the IACtHR to settle death penalty cases before the IACHR).
134. See e-mail Correspondence with IACHR, supra note 132 (stating that while
it is difficult to estimate, the Commission does not expect the court to issue a deci-
sion until the fall of 2001 or the spring of 2002).
135. See American Convention, supra note 2 (noting the reservations made at
the time of accession, and recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the IACtHR
with the limitation that the acceptance is valid only when the Court's decisions are
not inconsistent with Trinidadian laws).
136. See Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107, 12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
918, 933 (2000) (available via http://www.oas.org) (arguing that the death penalty
constitutes an "arbitrary and disproportionate punishment" that violates an individ-
ual's right to a fair trial). In this case, the petitioner alleged that Jamaica had vio-
lated Articles 1 (the obligation of each state to respect the rights enshrined in the
American Convention), Article 4 (the right to life), Article 5 (the right to humane
treatment), Article 7 (the right to personal liberty), Article 8 (the right to a fair
trial), Article 24 (the right to equal protection) and Article 25 (the right to judicial
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merits of the case, however, it must first determine whether it has ju-
risdiction to hear the case.'37 To ensure that the IACtHR has proper
jurisdiction to hear a specific case, the IACHR must follow specific
procedures before it submits a case to the court. Otherwise, it risks
having the case dismissed for not conforming to the procedural re-
quirements.' When a petition is submitted, the IACHR must first
determine whether the case is admissible.'" Second, it must request
certain information from the state that is accused of human rights
abuses. 4° In turn, the IACHR is required to furnish the state with the
relevant portions of the complaint against it.14 ' Next, the accused
protection) of the American Convention. Although some of the cases involving
Trinidad citizens are not yet open for public review, the issues presented in these
cases are basically the same as those raised in Cases 12.023, 12.044, 12.107,
12.126, and 12.146, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 918 (2000) (available via
http://www.oas.org). See Cases 12.005, 12.042, 12.052, 11.815, 11.854, 11.837,
11.816, 11.855, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1375-76 (1998, 1999) (available via
http://www.oas.org) (setting forth Trinidad's alleged violations of Articles 5 (the
right to humane treatment), Article 7 (the right to personal liberty), and Article 8
(the right to a fair trial) of the American Convention); see also Case 1 1.743, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 721 (2000) (available via http://www.oas.org) (alleging that Grenada
had violated petitioner's rights under Articles 4(1) (the right not to be arbitrarily
deprived of life), Article 4(6) (the right of a death row inmate to apply for amnesty,
pardon, or commutation of sentence, and to have his sentence stayed until all
pending decisions have been resolved), Article 5(1) (the right to have physical,
moral and mental integrity respected), Article 5(2) (the right not to be subjected to
torture, or to cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment or treatment), Article 5(6)
(the right to have reform and social re-adaptation as part of any punishment that
involves deprivation of liberty), Article 8 (the right to a fair trial) and Article 24
(the right to equal protection) of the American Convention).
137. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 64(1) (defining the IACtIR's
jurisdiction and competence to hear a case); see also Pasqualucci, supra note 34, at
19-54 (describing the practice of preliminary objections before the IACtHIR, which
is essentially a motion to dismiss the case). Under these proceedings, a state may
argue that the case was initially inadmissible, that the court has no jurisdiction to
hear the case, or that the petitioner(s) failed to observe the proper procedural re-
quirements, thereby making the case inadmissible. See id.
138. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61 (stating that in order for the
Court to hear a case, the specific procedures outlined in Articles 48 and 50 of the
Convention must be followed).
139. See supra Part L.A (discussing the requirements for admissibility before the
IACHR).
140. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 48(1)(a).
141. See id. (setting forth the procedures the IACHR must follow when it deter-
mines a case is admissible).
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state is given a reasonable period of time to comply with the Com-
mission's requests. 4 2 At some designated time, the record is closed
and no further information is accepted.4  After gathering the infor-
mation, the IACHR must determine whether the petition is still ad-
missible based on the evidence it has received.' The final procedural
requirement is that the IACHR place itself at the disposal of the par-
ties so that they may reach a "friendly settlement.""' If that fails, the
IACHR must draft a report stating the facts of the case and its find-
ings, and make recommendations to the state party' involved. "
Based on the IACHR reports outlining the procedural action taken
with respect to the Trinidad cases, the petitioners will most likely be
found to have fulfilled all of the necessary procedural requirements
for admissibility before the IACHR.' 4' Furthermore, after the peti-
tions were lodged, the IACHR followed standard procedures and at-
tempted friendly settlement with the Trinidadian government on a
number of the cases, but had no success. ' Only if the IACtHR finds
142. See Regulations of the IACHR, supra note 27, art. 34(51 (establshing a
timeframe of ninety days for states to respond to IACHR requests for information).
A state may also request, for "justifiable cause." a thirty day extension in order to
provide the requested information, but extensions may not be granted if the time-
frame will exceed 180 days. See id. art. 34(6).
143. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 480 )(b). If the record has not
been closed, however, the IACHR is authorized to verify facts, conduct an investi-
gation, and request more information from the alleged offending state. See hi arts.
48(1)(d)-(e).
144. See id. art. 48(1)(c) (authorizing the IACHR to -'declare the petition or
communication inadmissible or out of order on the basis of information or evi-
dence subsequently received").
145. See id. art. 48(1)(f) (stating that the "Commission shall place itself at the
disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of
the matter on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in this [Ameri-
can] Convention").
146. See id. art. 50 (1)(2)(providing that the Commission's report be sent to the
state(s) concerned, but forbidding the report to be published).
147. See Cases 12.005, 12.042, 12.052. 11.815, 11.854, 11.837, 11.816, 11.855,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1998, 1999) (available via http:,/www.oas.org) (noting that the
petitioners had fulfilled the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement, filed
their applications in a timely manner, and did not have any petitions pending be-
fore other international bodies); see also American Convention, supra note 2 (dis-
cussing the requirements for admissibility of a petition before the IACHR).
148. See Cases 12.005, 12.042, 12.052. 11.815, 11.854, 11.837, 11.816, 11.855,
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that the procedural requirements are met is it then allowed to rule on
the merits. '49
In addition to challenging the procedural requirements discussed
above, Trinidad may seek to challenge the IACtHR's jurisdictional
competence to hear death penalty cases based on a reservation it
made when it initially ratified the American Convention. '5° Accord-
ing to this reservation, the Trinidadian government recognizes the
competence of the IACtHR only with respect to matters not contra-
vening its Constitution or any of its domestic laws."' The American
Convention allows states to make certain reservations to their treaty
obligations.12 The IACtHR has held, however, that these reservations
must remain compatible with the fundamental principles of the Con-
.. 153th
vention. While the court did not determine specifically what con-
stituted an incompatible reservation, 154 its interpretation of the right
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1998, 1999) (available via http://www.oas.org) (describing
various attempts at friendly settlements, and noting that Trinidad refused to attend
hearings).
149. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(2) (stating that the proce-
dures in Articles 48 and 50 must be completed before the IACtHR can hear the
case). Articles 48 and 50 outline the specific procedures the IACHR must take
when it has received a complaint. See id. arts. 48, 50.
150. See American Convention, supra note 2 (examining the reservations to the
American Convention made by the Trinidadian government); Pasqualucci, supra
note 34, at 29 (examining the Court's jurisdiction, or lack thereof, in cases where
states have made reservations to the American Convention).
151. See American Convention, supra note 2 (stating that the Trinidadian gov-
ernment recognizes the competence of the IACtHR only as long as it does not "in-
fringe, create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen.").
152. See id. art. 75 (providing that all reservations to the Convention must con-
form to the provisions of the Vienna Convention); Vienna Convention, supra note
48, art. 19 (holding that reservations are acceptable except when "(a) the reserva-
tion is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty provides that only specified reserva-
tions, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or (c) ... the
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.").
153. See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American
Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 2, para. 22 (1982) (concluding that the reservations
which do not violate the principles of the American Convention are not subject to
approval by either the OAS or other member states in order for them to become
effective).
154. See id. para. 39 (declining to rule on issues that "might arise in the future in
connection with the interpretation and application of Article 4 of the [American]
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to life provisions of the American Convention'" denounces a reser-
vation that would effectively allow a state party to circumvent treaty
obligations. 56
Since Article 4(2) of the American Convention provides for the
death penalty in certain circumstances," and Trinidad's practice of
imposing the death penalty existed when the state ratified the Ameri-
can Convention,' current IACtHR jurisprudence indicates that
Trinidad is not in violation of its treaty obligations by simply im-
posing the death penalty for certain crimes. ' " The manner in which
the death sentence is imposed is still restricted, however, and the
Trinidadian government is obligated to comply with such restric-
tions.10
Convention.. .
155. See American Convention, supra note 2. art. 4 (defining the right to life
standards and placing restrictions on the administration of the death penalty); Ad-
visory Op. on the Death Penalty, supra note 83, para. 47 (holding Guatemala's res-
ervation to Article 4 of the American Convention invalid because, although it was
not prohibited by the Convention, it significantly -'weaken[ed] the system of pro-
tection established by that instrument.").
156. See Advisory Op. on the Death Penalty, supra note 83. paras. 63- 64 (sug-
gesting that a reservation would be invalid if a state, acting on its own, wished to
interpret that reservation in a way that would clearly violate the fundamental prin-
ciples of the American Convention). The IACtHR also held that a reservation must
be "interpreted by examining its text in accordance with the ordinary meaning
which must be attributed to [it] ... [and that] this approach must be followed ex-
cept when the resultant interpretation ... is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." I.
157. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 4(2) (outlining one of the re-
strictions on the death penalty, which states that "in countries that have not abol-
ished the death penalty, it may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.. ."}.
158. See id. (setting forth Trinidad and Tobago's reservations to the American
Convention and the jurisdiction of the IACtHR). At the time of accession, Trinidad
lodged a reservation that allowed for the imposition of the death sentence on any-
one over seventy years of age, and recognized the jurisdiction of the Court as long
as it did not "infringe, create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private
citizen." Id.
159. See Advisory Op. on the Death Penalty, supra note 83, para. 70 (allowing
for the continued imposition of the death penalty for crimes to which it applied at
the signing and making of reservations). The IACtHR specifically held that no
state may extend the death penalty to "crimes for which such a penalty wvas not
previously provided for under domestic law" or "extend by subsequent legislation
the application of the death penalty to crimes for which this penalty was not previ-
ously provided." Id.
160. See IACtHR Court Order, supra note 5 (discussing the fact that Trinidad
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While the above sections focused solely on existing obligations
under the American Convention, the following sections will examine
the implications of the Trinidadian government's actions both before
and after the period of continuing obligations expires.'6 '
V. IMPLICATIONS FOLLOWING TRINIDAD AND
TOBAGO'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
AMERICAN CONVENTION
The decision of the Trinidadian government to withdraw from the
American Convention threatens to have a detrimental effect on the
rights of Trinidadian citizens on death row, and within the Inter-
American system in general. 62 Although Trinidadian citizens will
still be allowed to submit petitions to the IACHR in the post-
withdrawal period, 6 1 they will be denied the opportunity to seek re-
lief under the American Convention, which is not only binding," but
also offers the most comprehensive and extensive list of rights pro-
tected in the Inter-American system.' 6' As such, Trinidadian citizens
will only be able to seek relief through the American Declaration,
which is a much narrower definition of human rights in the region. 6
has continuing obligations under the Inter-American system, despite having with-
drawn from the American Convention).
161. See supra notes 54-79 and accompanying text (discussing the continuing
obligations of the Trinidadian government under the American Convention despite
its withdrawal, but also recognizing that these obligations would not last for an in-
definite period of time).
162. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that other
Caribbean nations are poised to follow Trinidad and Tobago's lead on the death
penalty issue); Al ANN. REP. 1999, supra note 4 (arguing that Trinidad's decision
to withdraw from the American Convention would have a detrimental effect on the
Inter-American human rights system because it precludes international investiga-
tion of alleged human rights abuses).
163. See Regulations of the IACHR, supra note 27, arts. 51-54 (describing the
procedures for petitions concerning states that are not a party to the American
Convention).
164. See supra Part I.B (discussing the binding nature of the American Conven-
tion).
165. See Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, 35, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc. rev. I
(1981 ) (holding that a State that is not a party to the American Convention can not
be found to be in violation of any of the rights enshrined therein).
166. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. paras. 43, 47, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.71, doc.
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Finally, because other Caribbean nations are poised to follow Trini-
dad's lead, the system for protecting human rights within the Inter-
American region will be similarly curtailed for many others.'"
A. DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
TRINIDADIAN CITIZENS
For now, the Trinidadian government still has existing obligations
under the American Convention.' Although it may be in compliance
with treaty obligations even as it practices capital punishment, the
Trinidadian government is not relieved of its obligation under the
American Convention to provide due process. ' The complaints
against the Trinidadian government allege that the state is in viola-
tion of the American Convention for the following reasons: imposing
a mandatory death sentence, failing to allow opportunity to petition
for amnesty, cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners, failing to try
the petitioners within a reasonable amount of time, depriving its citi-
zens the right to a fair trial, and failing to provide adequate legal
9 rev. 1 (1987) (stressing that even though Article I of the American Declaration
does not specifically mention the death penalty, certain provisions of the OAS
Charter give the American Declaration at least some binding force).
167. See infra note 205 (suggesting that Trinidad's withdrawal from the Ameri-
can Convention could cause a chain reaction within the region).
168. See IACtHR Court Order, supra note 5 (detailing the continuing obliga-
tions of the Trinidadian government).
169. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8. 24-25 (outlining due proc-
ess guarantees); see also id. art. 27(1) (noting that the only time a state can suspend
certain guarantees is "[i]n time of war, public danger, or other emergency that
threatens the independence or security of a State Party..."). Suspension of the
following articles, however, as well as the "judicial guarantees essential for the
protection of such rights," is not permitted: Art. 3 (the right to juridical personal-
ity), Art. 4 (the right to life), Art. 5 (the right to humane treatment). Art. 6 (free-
dom from slavery), Art. 9 (freedom from ex post facto la'%s), Art. 12 (freedom of
conscience and religion), Art. 17 (the rights of the family). Art. 18 (the right to a
name), Art. 19 (the rights of the child), Art. 20 (the right to nationality), and Art.
23 (the right to participate in government). See i.L; see also Habeas Corpus in
Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) of the American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Jan. 30, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) (1987), reprinted in 1987 INTER-AM. Y.B., supra note 83, at 750, 770 (ar-
guing that the legal remedies afforded by Articles 7(6) and 2511) of the American
Convention cannot be suspended because "'they are judicial guarantees essential for
the protection of the rights and freedoms whose suspension Article 27(2) prohib-
its.").
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aid.170
In interpreting Article 5 of the American Convention, the IACtHR
has held that a prisoner's right to humane treatment includes the right
to a minimum standard of living conditions.' In cases where there is
no substantive proof or where there is uncorroborated or conflicting
testimony, however, the court has refrained from charging the state
with a violation of the American Convention. In the case of the
Trinidadian petitioners, if the IACtHR is not able to gather more evi-
dence during the course of the trial, 7 1 the IACHR findings that there
were no violations of Article 5 in the Trinidadian prisons will
stand.'
7 4
Another alleged violation of the American Convention concerns
the right of Trinidadian citizens to go before a competent, independ-
ent and impartial tribunal.'7 5 Significantly, the only issue that the
IACtHR has addressed thus far is the effect of separation of powers
on the independence and impartiality of any judicial system.'' While
170. See Petitions and Cases Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
Provisional Measures and Legal Proceedings, reprinted in IACHR ANN. RriP.
1999, supra note 3, at 1376 (providing a general list of the allegations against the
Trinidadian government).
171. See Neira Alegria et al. Case, Decision of Jan. 19, 1995, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
para. 60 (1995), reprinted in 1995 INTER-AM. Y.B. ON H.R. (OAS) 684, 722
[hereinafter 1995 INTER-AM. Y.B.] (holding that anyone "deprived of his or her
liberty has the right to live in detention conditions compatible with his or her per-
sonal dignity.").
172. See id. at 736 (stating that Peru had not violated Article 5 because there
was no proof of inhumane treatment or of anyone offending the prisoners' dignity
while the prisoner was in custody).
173. See Ver6nica G6mez, The Interaction Between the Political Actors of the
OAS, the Commission, and the Court, in The INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 201-09 (highlighting the IACtHR's limited financial re-
sources, and indicating that fact finding missions are difficult for the Court to un-
dertake).
174. See, e.g., Case 11.815, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 45, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.102
Doe. 6 rev. (1999) (detailing Trinidadian prison conditions in general and finding
no evidence of cruel and inhumane treatment). But cf Thomas v. Baptiste, [2000] 2
A.C. 1 (P.C. 1999) (describing prison conditions as "hot, stuffy and cramped").
175. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(1) (stating that every person
has the right to a hearing before a "competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law").
176. See Case 11.006, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1995), reprinted in 1995 INTER-AM.
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confidence in the Trinidadian judiciary is low,' the sheer extent of
judicial corruption and incompetence that the IACtHR envisaged in
past cases simply does not exist on a massive scale in Trinidad.'"
In terms of providing the petitioners with other due process guar-
antees, 7 9 however, the IACHR has determined that each case must be
evaluated with respect to its own circumstances, '" thus making it dif-
ficult to predict how the court will rule on the complaints against
Trinidad. 8' In such cases, the IACtHR has interpreted the state's ob-
ligations with respect to Article 1(1) of the American Convention,
and held the state responsible for the denial of any of the rights as de-
fined within the Convention.
Trinidadian obligations under the American Convention will con-
tinue until there are no more cases alleging violations of the Ameri-
can Convention during the period that the state was still a signa-
tory."' At that time, Trinidadian citizens will need to rely mainly on
Y.B., supra note 171, at 232, 276 (quoting tie Commission. who asserted: "effec-
tive observance of [judicial] guarantees is based on the independence of the judici-
ary."').
177. See infra notes 216-217 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of con-
fidence in the Trinidadian judiciary).
178. See Case 11.006, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1995), in 1995 INTER-AM. Y.B., su-
pra note 171, at 232 (discussing the significant impact of the reorganization of the
Peruvian judicial system on due process guarantees).
179. See, e.g., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1l),
46(2)(a)-(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 11, para. 28 (1990)
[hereinafter Advisory Op.: Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies] (implying that the
right to legal representation is a "due guarantee").
180. See Case 11.815, Inter-Am. C.H.R. para. 48, OEA Ser.L.,V 11.102 doe. 6
rev. (1999) (declining to accept petitioner's argument that a specific amount of
time between arrest and adjudication is an ipsof acto violation of his rights).
181. See supra note 117 (noting that IACHR reports and pleadings submitted to
the IACtHR are kept secret, thus making it even more difficult to verify the facts of
each case until after the Court publishes its rulings).
182. See, e.g., Godinez Cruz Case, Decision of Jan. 20, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(1989), in 1989 INTER-AM. Y.B. ON H.R. (OAS) 656, 726-40 [hereinafter 1989
INTER-AM. Y.B.] (emphasizing that an allegation of abuse in violation of any pro-
vision of the American Convention results in an alleged violation of Article 11) of
the Convention).
183. See Ivcher Bronstein Case, Judgment of Sept. 24. 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
355, 368-69, OEA/Ser. GCP/ doe. 3285/00 (2000) (holding that a state may only
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the IACHR's interpretation and application of the American Decla-
ration in order to safeguard their rights.D4 The next section discusses
the IACHR's approach to the death penalty under the American
Declaration, and focuses on the impact that the Trinidadian govern-
ment's decision to withdraw from the American Convention will
have on the Inter-American system as a whole.'"
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
The IACHR addressed the Article 1 right to life standard under the
American Declaration in two major cases-the Roach and Pinkerton
case, decided in 1987,186 and the Celestine case, decided in 1989.1"' In
its adjudication of the Roach and Pinkerton case, the IACHR ad-
dressed the question of whether the United States could execute a
person who had committed murder, but who was under eighteen
years of age.'88 After reiterating the United States' obligations under
the American Declaration,'89 the IACHR sought to define the exact
be released from its obligations under the American Convention if it has given the
appropriate notice, but noting that the release from obligations is not immediate).
184. See SCHABAS, supra note 80, at 266-73 (noting that countries that have not
passed the American Convention into law are still bound to a petition protocol be-
fore the IACHR, and outlining two landmark IACHR capital punishment cases re-
viewed under such a petition protocol).
185. See id. (discussing the IACHR's interpretation of the American Declaration
with respect to death penalty cases brought against states not a party to the Ameri-
can Convention).
186. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para. 6, OEA/Ser.L.iV/II.71, Doc. 9 rev.
1 (1987) (alleging that the United States had violated Article l's (the right to life),
Article 7's (the special protection for children), and Article 26's (the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment) provisions under the American Declara-
tion).
187. See Case 10.031, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62, 63, OEA/Ser.L.IV/Il.77 rev.1, Doc.
7 (1989) (alleging that the United States had violated Article I (the right to life),
Article 2 (equality before the law without distinction as to race), and Article 26
(the right to be given an impartial and public hearing) of the American Declara-
tion).
188. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para. 42, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.71, Doc. 9
rev. 1 (1987) (defining the issue as whether sentencing minors under eighteen years
of age to death is contrary to the human rights standards with which the United
States must comply).
189. See id. at paras. 45-48 (noting that the United States had signed the OAS
Charter, and was consequently bound to the American Declaration and the IACHR
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scope and meaning of the American Declaration's right to life provi-
sion.'9 In its determination, the IACHR examined whether custom-
ary international law prohibited the execution of persons under
eighteen years of age, and concluded that it did."
In the Celestine case, the IACHR faced the issue of whether the
death penalty - applied in a racially discriminatory and partial man-
ner - denied the petitioner's right to life under the American Decla-
ration.192 The petitioner was an African-American man from Louisi-
ana, sentenced to death for raping and murdering a white woman.
Petitioner claimed that the victim's race was the most significant
factor in determining whether to impose the death penalty, and pro-
vided various statistical studies as evidence of the racial discrimina-
tion that occurred during sentencing.' The IACHR, however, agreed
with the United States government that the presentation of mere sta-
tistical studies alone does not constitute sufficient proof of racial dis-
crimination.'9
To date, the LACHR's explication of the right to life provision of
Statute). The IACHR then held that Articles 3(j). 16. 51(e), 112 and 150 of the
OAS Charter, as well as the other instruments signed by the United States govern-
ment, served to make the American Declaration binding. See ul.; see ailso supra
Part LB (discussing the binding force of the American Declaration).
190. See id. at para. 43 (stressing the fact that the American Declaration does not
explicitly state a position on the death penalty, thus forcing the IACHR to deter-
mine the scope of the provision, i.e., whether the provision meant to abolish the
death penalty in member states or to place a restriction on the application of the
death penalty with respect to juveniles).
191. See id. at paras. 50-54 (discussing the role ofjus cogens, and defining it as
a set of mores that is either expressly or implicitly accepted - by law or through
tradition - as a group of rules that help define and shape "international public pol-
icy"). The IACHR concluded that the accepted norm within the Inter-American
system precluded the execution of juveniles. See id. at 302.
192. See Case 10.031, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62. OEA Ser.L. V 11.77 rev. I Doc.7
(1989) (stating the main issue of the case to be determined).
193. See id. (setting forth the facts of the case and the petitioner's complaint.
194. See id. at 63-66 (discussing the bases of the petitioner's claims).
195. See id. at 72 (holding that the petitioner failed to persuade the IACHR that
statistical evidence alone was sufficient to show an intent to discriminate). The
IACHR then concluded that the United States was not in violation of the American
Declaration for not accepting this insufficient piece of evidence as proof of racial
bias. See id.
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the American Declaration remains limited in scope. 1 6 Furthermore,
because the American Declaration fails to mention the issue of the
death penalty anywhere in its provisions, death row inmates have
greater difficulty articulating their complaints. 197 Finally, since only
the IACtHR can issue binding decisions or provisional measures,""
under the American Declaration, there is no meaningful opportunity
for relief, 9 or a stay of execution while the application is pending
before the IACHR.2 O
These observances are significant in terms of impact on the Inter-
American system. If more countries follow Trinidad's lead, as is ex-
pected to happen, then the purpose of the Inter-American system -
the protection of human rights - will be undermined."'
196. See SCHABAS, supra note 80, at 266-70 (explaining that the IACHR re-
jected the broad "customary international law" argument asserted in the Roach &
Pinkerton Case, with respect to death sentences for offenders under the age of
eighteen).
197. Compare American Convention, supra note 2, with American Declaration,
supra note 13 (suggesting that death penalty claims under the American Conven-
tion are easier because they provide a list of enumerated rights and restrictions
upon the application of the death penalty, while the American Declaration's broad
statement regarding the right to life leaves much for future definition and interpre-
tation).
198. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 62.1, 63.2 (declaring that
once a country has recognized the IACtHR's jurisdiction, the court is authorized to
make binding decisions on all cases that come before it, and require analysis of the
American Convention); see also supra Part II.A (emphasizing that the American
Declaration has no similar provisions, and that claims arising under it may not be
referred to the IACtHR).
199. See id. art. 63 (stating that if a violation of the American Convention has
occured, the IACtHR has the authority to order the State Party involved to allow
the petitioner the enjoyment of the right or freedom that was violated). The Ameri-
can Convention also authorizes the IACtHR to order that fair compensation be paid
to the injured party. See id. While the Regulations of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights authorize the 1ACHR to hear petitions against states not a
party to the American Convention, it does not provide for any type of relief other
than non-binding recommendations and reports. See Regulations of the IACHR,
supra note 27, arts. 51-54 (outlining specific procedures for countries that are not
parties to the American Convention).
200. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. para. 9, OEA/Ser.L./VI1.71, doc. 9
rev.1 (1987) (demonstrating that the IACHR requested the United States govern-
ment to stay the execution of the petitioners "in the spirit of major human rights
instruments," but noting that the government flatly refused this request).
201. See generally Davidson, supra note 12, ch. I (discussing the birth of, and
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRINIDAD AND
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
In April 2000, the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs
within the OAS emphasized the continuing need to evaluate and
strengthen the Inter-American human rights system!", This section
recognizes some of the weaknesses in the system, and makes rec-
ommendations for strengthening the protection of human rights
within both Trinidad and the Inter-American system.
A. FOR THE TRINIDADIAN GOVERNMENT
For Trinidad, re-accession to the American Convention should be
a priority.2 ' The unprecedented action taken by the government in
withdrawing from the American Convention threatens to have sig-
nificant and detrimental consequences for human rights in the Carib-
bean, as other Caribbean nations are now positioned to follow Trini-
dad's lead.20' As the most practical alternative to complete
withdrawal from the Inter-American system, Trinidad should follow,
the Privy Council's decision in Thomas v. Baptiste!"' By disallowing
impetus behind, the establishment of the Inter-American human rights system).
202. See Dialogue on the Inter-American Sisten, supra note 11 (reporting ef-
forts by the OAS General Assembly to "promote dialogue and cooperation" among
the various human rights entities within the Inter-American system).
203. See id. (discussing the ways in which the IACHR seeks to strengthen the
Inter-American system, such as being more efficient when processing complaints,
and instituting better follow-up procedures after the IACHR has issued its recom-
mendations, including hearings).
204. See Al ANN. REP. 1999, supra note 4 (deploring the Trinidadian govern-
ment's decision to withdraw ratification of the American Convention); see also
Continuing of Obligations Under hIternational Human Rghts Treaties, Economic
and Social Council, E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/1995/5 (1999) (urging the Trinidadian
government to resume its obligations under the American Convention).
205. See St.Lucia - Capital Punishment: Prime Minister Backs Resumption of
Punishment, EFE NEWS SERV., June 10. 1999, WL, ALLNEWSPLUS file (ex-
pressing the intention of the government of St. Lucia to resume carrying out capital
punishment at an "appropriate time."); see also Schiffrin, supra note 4, at 565 (ex-
pressing concern that Trinidad and Tobago's withdrawal from the American Con-
vention, coupled with Jamaica's withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. would "serve as a catalyst for
other countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean... to follow suit.").
206. See Thomas i% Baptiste, [2000] 2 A.C. I (P.C. 1999) (holding that a delay
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the time spent petitioning international commissions to count toward
the Pratt time limit, Trinidad will not be forced to eliminate the
death penalty by having to commute the death sentences of those
who appeal and those whose appeals are delayed.0 7 Although this
option is not the most expedient, it is the most practical.0 Conse-
quently, this option also allows for the review of procedural safe-
guards that have been instituted to protect human rights, even if deci-
sions are not legally binding on the Trinidadian government.2
B. FOR STRENGTHENING THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
A major problem inherent in the Inter-American system, as with
any other system, is the issue of state compliance with treaty obliga-
tions and court decisions."0 Part of the problem stems from states'
efforts to protect their sovereignty from international encroachment
into its domestic affairs.2" ' Within the last decade, however, the OAS
caused by application to an international commission shall not hinder the imple-
mentation of the sentence; thus, the time spent appealing shall not be counted as
part of Pratt's two-year time limit for carrying out executions).
207. See Pratt v. Att'v Gen. for Jam., [1994] 2 A.C.1, 34 (P.C. 1993) (holding
that if the time limit set to implement an execution has passed, the death sentence
shall be commuted); see also Schiffrin, supra note 4, at 565-68 (discussing the im-
plications of the Pratt case, as it affects Caribbean nations' efforts to resume or
expedite the death penalty).
208. Cf Pasqualucci, supra note 34, at 7 (pointing out that even if some peti-
tioners appeal their cases in the hope of delaying the process and commuting their
sentences, countries also seek to delay international tribunals' consideration of a
case by lodging preliminary objections to prolong the process).
209. See Claudio Grossman, Moving Toward Improved Human Rights Enforce-
nent in the Americas, 27 HuM. RTS. 16, 16-18 (2000) (discussing the importance
of in-country visits, fact-finding missions, and even non-binding reports in bring-
ing human rights violations to the forefront of international attention). Grossman
suggests that exposure of human rights violations to the international community
could lessen or even lead to the curtailment of human rights abuses within a par-
ticular country. See id.; see also Regulations of the IACHR, supra note 27, arts.
51-54 (recognizing that, with respect to states not parties to the American Conven-
tion, the IACHR may request information from governments involved, transmit the
charges lodged against a government to that government, separate or combine
cases, declare the complaint inadmissible, and conduct a hearing to verify facts).
210. See Cerna, supra note 52, at 740 (suggesting that compliance affects the
efficacy of the system because states comply only when it is convenient to do so).
211. See generally OAS Charter, supra note 45, arts. 1, 3(e) (emphasizing the
sovereignty and independence of OAS member states).
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has moved from a relatively non-interventionist policy toward a
more aggressive one. 212 One step in making the Inter-American hu-
man rights system more effective would be to authorize the OAS
General Assembly to take action when a country is in gross violation
of the American Convention and other Inter-American human rights
principles. Effective restraints may include the suspension of voting
rights in the General Assembly, sanctions, or even suspension of
membership in the OAS until the human rights abuses have been
remedied.
A second problem relates to the issue of individual participation in
the Commission's proceedings. Unlike the European system, peti-
tioners in the Inter-American system are not allowed to participate in
proceedings before the IACtHR."" Although one must recognize that
many of the petitioners to the IACtHR are prisoners and are prohib-
ited from participating directly in the proceedings, allowing the peti-
tioners' lawyers to participate directly in the proceedings T would
better serve the interests of all concerned. Counsel for the petitioners
are better equipped to handle the cases in an efficient manner. This
would only lighten the burdens placed on the IACHR's limited re-
215
sources.
The requirement that petitioners exhaust domestic remedies is an-
212. See G6mez, supra note 173, at 191 (citing the Washington Protocol and
Resolution 1080 as two instruments which vest in the General Assembly of the
OAS the authority to take action with respect to "'interruptions" of democratic gov-
erning in member states).
213. See Jos6 Miguel Vivanco & Lisa L. Bhansali. Procedural Shortcomings, in
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 421, 435 (de-
scribing the current Inter-American system as one that creates inequity between the
defendant State Party and the individual petitioner).
214. See id. at 436 (highlighting recent procedural amendments in the IACtHR
that now permit the petitioner's attorney to submit a brief at the compensation
phase of the trial, if the court deems it necessary).
215. See Cerna, supra note 52, at 736 (pointing out that the Inter-Amencan sys-
tem has not yet been able to institute a system that can effectively monitor and
promote human rights similar to the one adopted by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee). Recent downsizing by the OAS also leads to the conclusion
that the IACHR simply does not possess the capabilities and resources for estab-
lishing such an expensive system of monitoring. See G6mez, supra note 173, at
202 (suggesting that sporadic augmentation of the Commission's budget is a major
reason that it has been so inefficient and relatively ineffective in achieving its
wide-ranging goals).
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other obstacle to overcome. Even in the more democratic societies of
the Caribbean, judicial systems are in fact unable to administer jus-
tice in a fair and impartial manner.16 Although there are exceptions
to the domestic remedies requirement, 211 the current system is ill-
adapted to consider the nuances of each country's judicial system
and of each specific case. Of course, the petitioners should not be
allowed to bypass domestic remedies. Granting the IACHR or even
the OAS General Assembly more interventionist powers might force
States Parties to comply with their international obligations.
Furthermore, the IACHR has limited powers and can only con-
sider whether state national courts follow the procedures, or whether
the decision infringes on the right to a fair trial or other guarantees in
the American Convention. In such cases, domestic laws that deny
individuals their rights, as guaranteed by the American Convention,
are not as open to review as they should be. It is necessary to provide
the IACHR with a more powerful mandate in interpreting the do-
216. See Vivanco & Bhansali, supra note 213, at 430 (remarking that "ineffi-
ciency, corruption, and lack of material and human resources" plague the judicial
systems of some countries, and thus hamper the ability of petitioners to truly take
advantage of all available domestic remedies); see also Richards, supra note 4
(stating that more than half of Trinidadians have no faith in their local judicial
system).
217. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 46(1)(a), 46(2) (asserting that
the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement does not apply when that state's
laws do not provide ample due process to the petitioner, the petitioner has been de-
nied access to all local remedies, and there has been unwarranted delay in reaching
a decision on the petitioner's case); see also Advisory Op.: Exhaustion of Domes-
tic Remedies, supra note 179, paras. 31-32, 35 (concluding that if the petitioner is
indigent and unable to afford legal fees, or if he is not afforded counsel due to fear
in the local legal community, he is exempt from the exhaustion of domestic reme-
dies requirement and can petition the IACHR directly). But see In re Viviana Gal-
lardo, Decision of Nov. 13, 1981, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. G 101/81, para. 25, reprinted
in 20 I.L.M. 1424 (1981) (holding that even if the exhaustion of domestic remedies
requirement has been met, the petitioner is also required to exhaust all remedies
available through the IACHR before the IACtHR can hear the case).
218. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 46(2) (providing for certain
jurisdictional requirements to be waived when the "domestic legislation of the
State concerned does not afford due process of law for protection of the rights that
have allegedly been violated," but not providing any enforcement mechanisms to
ensure State compliance with IACHR decisions); see also American Convention,
supra note 2, arts. 48-51 (outlining the procedure for considering and resolving
petitions).
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mestic legislation of States Parties in accordance with the letter and
spirit of regional human rights instruments.
To ensure greater compliance with treaty obligations and interna-
tional human rights standards, the IACtHR's limited jurisdiction
should be expanded to allow the court to consider violations of the
American Declaration. This expansion will guarantee protection for
citizens of states not a party to the American Convention.
While the current approach under the Inter-American system is not
without its merits, the purpose of establishing the Inter-American
human rights system was to guarantee that states, acting outside of
the regional norms, do not violate the individual liberties guaranteed
in the American Convention.21 ' Because of this limitation, the
IACtHR is precluded from "calling" states on their domestic legisla-
tion or forcing them to bring the legislation into compliance with in-
ternational or regional norms. Hopefully, allowing the IACtHR more
power will achieve this goal.
CONCLUSION
Although the American Convention does not preclude Trinidad
and Tobago from applying the death penalty, it restricts the way in
which the death penalty is administered and guarantees certain due
process rights to Trinidadian citizens." Furthermore, the highest
Court of Appeal for Caribbean states, the British Privy Council, has
held that as long as Trinidad and Tobago remains bound by the
American Convention, its citizens must be allowed to have their pe-
titions heard by the IACHR before the implementation of their death
sentences. 22 'Trinidad and Tobago has thus violated the due process
rights of those executed prisoners with cases pending before the
219. See Advisory Op. on the Death Penalty, supra note 83, paras. 63-64 (de-
nouncing efforts by States Parties to define their own obligations with respect to
the American Convention, and noting that such practices conflict with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties).
220. See supra Parts II, III (discussing continuing obligations of the Trinidadian
government under the American Convention and the continuing rights of Trini-
dadian citizens).
221. See supra Part III.B (explaining that due process under the Trinidadian
Constitution included due process rights accorded by the government when it
signed the American Convention).
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IACHR.
In addition to these blatant violations of the American Convention,
the withdrawal of Trinidad and Tobago from the American Conven-
tion also threatens to have a significant detrimental effect on the due
process rights of Trinidadian citizens, as well as on the advancement
of human rights in the region."' For one, Trinidadians may now rely
only on the IACHR's interpretation and application of the limited
rights guaranteed under the American Declaration in order to safe-
guard their rights. Furthermore, because many other Caribbean states
are poised to follow Trinidad and Tobago's lead, many more citizens
of other Caribbean states are in line to lose the right to hold their
countries to the human rights standards as accepted within the inter-
American system. As such, the Trinidadian government is urged to
take the necessary steps for re-accession to the respective treaties and
to allow its citizens the opportunity for due process of law in accor-
dance with the American Convention and the Trinidadian Constitu-
tion."'
222. See Birdsong, supra note 5, at 308 (stressing that due process is denied to
death row inmates who are either read death warrants or are executed before their
appeal before international human rights bodies are decided); see also supra Part V
(discussing the due process implications for Trinidadian citizens as well as within
the inter-American system).
223. See TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. art. 4(a) (defining the right of the individual
to life liberty and security of person).
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